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Abstract _ 
This note addresses some microstructure consequences of the Spanish Stock Exchange Reform 
on measures of systematic risk of daily asset returns. The Reform modified the trading system, 
clearing and settlement procedures among other changes. This note focuses on how these events 
affected systematic risk measures and autocorrelations in a sample of selected stocks. After the 
Reform significant decreases in autocorrelations and lower biases in the betas are found, 
suggesting that the Reform had increased market's operational efficiency. However, Banks sector 
have special features which are explained in terms of trade mechanisms. 
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1. INTRODUCIJQN 
Research in microstructure analysis has blossomed in the last ten years. Since the book by 
Cohen et al. (1986) there is a growing work in this area, see Modest (1993) for a recent 
review. Microstructure analysis considers the interplay among market agents, trading systems 
and the behavior of security returns when trading is affected by frictions, like delays in 
settlement procedures or transaction costs. 
When the trading mechanisms changes, as has been the case in London's Big Bang in 1986 
or Paris in 1987, one interesting aspect is how the new regimes affect the order flow and 
prices formation. One example is the paper by Pagano and Roell (1990) on the Paris Bourse. 
For the Spanish stock market whose Big Bang was in 1989, there are few studies on these 
issues. The work by Urrutia (1990) focused on the volatility and volume effects after the 
change in the market's settlement and trading procedures. He found evidence of lower 
volatility in almost all sectors except the Banking sector whose volatility increased, and no 
clear effects on volume after the reforms. In an extensive analysis of the Banking sector, 
Berges and Soria (1992) found similar results. This note aims to extend previous research 
using the same database but focusing on some microstructure consequences of the Spanish 
Stock Exchange Reform on measures of systematic risk of daily asset returns. The Reform 
modified the trading system, clearing and settlement procedures among other changes. This 
note focuses on how these measures affected systematic risk measures and autocorrelations 
in a sample of selected stocks. The paper is organized as follows. Market structure is 
discussed first. Then we present data, methodology and results. We address concluding 
remarks in the final section. 
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2. MARKET STRUCfURE 
There are four stock exchanges in Spain; Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao. Madrid 
is the dominant exchange, accounting for almost 90% of trading activity. At the end of 1993 
the total market value of equities quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange was about 1% of 
World's capitalization. The largest individual sector was Banking (24% of the total), followed 
by Electrical Utilities (21 %), Telecommunications (11 %), Oil and Chemicals (10%), 
Construction (8%), Investments (6%) and Iron & Steel (5%). Foreign investors are free to 
invest in the Spanish securities markets. The market is an order driven market, in contrast 
with other exchanges (NYSE, LSE) which are quote driven markets. 
The Spanish Securities Market Act (SSMA) took effect in July 1989 and its main points are 
(among others) as follows. Official Stock Market Agents, previously appointed by the 
Government, were replaced by private Brokers and Dealers. Trading mechanism was changed 
with the introduction of the Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS) open from 11 :OOam 
to 5:00pm and the termination of the traditional open outcry trading process l . Brokerage 
Fees were liberalized. Also the National Stock Exchange Commission (CNMV), Spain's 
version of the US's SEC, was created. 
A new settlement and clearing service was created (NSL) and was operational at the same 
time that CATS; cash balances are cleared in 48 hours. Before SSMA, cash balances of 
operations from one given week (Monday to Friday) were cleared on next week Friday. The 
1 The old trading system were based on daily auctions developed at fixed time 
intervals, and with only three hours of total trading time (from 10 AM to 1 PM). 
3 
settlement period is T+ 10, and before SSMA was T+30. In April 1993 the CNMV opened 
its new Servicio de Compensacion y Liquidacion (SCVL), the securities settlement and 
clearing service aimed at expediting the settlement period. The new system initially reduces 
the settlement period in Spain from T+ 10 and in some cases T+ 15 to T+7; later in 1994 
the exchange believes this period will be reduced further to T+5. 
To give one reference of CATS evolution, it started on April 1989 and on May 1990, 
securities listed on CATS represented almost 90% of the total market value of Madrid Stock 
Exchange. 
3. IHEDATA 
In this paper we use a sample of 37 stocks, which are both the most frequently traded at 
Madrid2 and the most important of each sector. These stocks are representative of the nine 
sectorial divisions (Foodstuffs, Banks, Communications,Construction, Utilities, Investment 
Funds, Chemicals, Iron & Steel and Others) and account for almost 60% of Trading Volume 
at Madrid. 
The sample are daily returns from January, 1 1988 to July 30, 199Q3, so there are 638 data 
points for each firm. There are from 350 to 450 data (depending on the date of first listing 
2 There are about 400 securities listed in the Madrid Stock Exchange, but only 80 
are actively traded. We consider only securities not affected by takeovers or other disturbing 
events. Given these restrictions we tried to choose a representative enough sample. 
3 The reader interested in details of the construction of the return series and corrections 
for dividends, stock splits, and other effects should consult Urrutia (1990). 
4 
in CATS) before the securities were listed in CATS and from 300 to 200 after the listing. 
Table 1 summarizes number of firms in each sector, sectorial market value and weight in the 
IGBM. 
This sample has been chosen to minimize possible influences from the October 1987 
meltdown, and from the Gulf crisis at the beginning of August 1990. However we could not 
avoid possible effects from the "mini-crash" of October 1989. 
As a "market" factor we use the Madrid Stock Exchange's general Index (IGBM). It is made 
up each year of 70-90 companies and represents about 80-85 % of the total capitalization of 
the market, excluding foreign stocks. It accounts for dividends and stock splits, and is a 
market value weighted index. Therefore it should reflect mainly the behavior of the big 
firms. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
Our target is to study if the Reform affected systematic risk measures and autocorrelations 
in returns. We define returns as the natural logarithms of price relatives adjusted for 
dividends and splits. We assume that the "true" return ri,t for security j in time t is generated 
by the market model 
(1) 
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where ~ is the market index "true" return. We also assume that due to frictions in the 
trading process some kind of price-adjustment delay happens. Thus we obtain a series of 
observed returns for security j in time t, t'j,l which are related to true returns as follows: 
N 
(2)xJ, t=L 4»j, t-n,n xj , t-n 
n-O 
where +are independent random variables both between true returns and between securities. 
In equation (2), 4lj,ton,n is the proportion of the true return rj,ton generated in time t-n included 
o periods later in the observed return in time t. If there are no delays, 4lj,ton,n is zero for any 
positive 0 and one for 0=0. Different assumptions about possible values for the realization 
of random variable +, and time delay n provides different models for the adjustment process. 
Scholes and Williams (1977), fixed 0= 1, and Cohen et al. (1983) extended their analysis to 
0> 1. In essence, the idea is that observed returns are computed as linear combinations of 
true returns with fixed (and known) lags (0) and parameters (41j,ton,J The model is further 
extended by 1.0 and MacKinlay (1990) which allow for any lag 0 and random parameters. 
Our first target is the estimation of measures of systematic risk in our data before and after 
the reforms. We use the market model (1). However, for the observed returns, the 
"observed" market model is 
(3) 
It is well known that OLS estimators of beta are biased and inconsistent is there are delays 
in price adjustments. To cope with these problems we estimate the betas using the Scholes 
and Williams (1977) (SW) and Cohen et al.(1983a) (CHMSW) estimators The SW method 
.. ,----------------------_._--------....,--_. 
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uses a variate of the observed market model 
k=-l,O,l (4) 
and the consistent estimator of systematic risk is 
1 
Pi =E bj~k/ (1+2~1) (5) 
k--l 
where bOj,t are OLS estimators and PI is the (observed) first order autocorrelation coefficient 
of market index returns. 
Another consistent estimator of true beta can be found using the CHMSW method which 
allows for more than one day in price adjustments (Le. n> 1). The estimator is 
N N N 
(6)Pi = (bf+E bi~n+E bj~n) / (1+2E ~n) 
n-l n-l n-l 
Estimated residual first order autocorrelation from (3) are then analyzed, before and after 
reforms using OLS, SW and CHMSW estimators. 
5. RESULTS 
Table 2 present OLS betas and first order residual autocorrelations for total sample and 
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before and after CATS4• Standard errors are computed using heteroscedastic-consistent 
procedures, see White (1980). Overall, systematic risk are lower after CATS and 
autocorrelations are lower and nonsignificant. However the Banks sector behaves differently. 
Their betas increase and their autocorrelations are lower than before CATS but still 
significant. Also in agreement with results in Urrutia (1990) residual volatility is lower after 
CATS. 
To take into account price-adjustment delays and other possible frictions we reestimate all 
models using SW and CHMSWs estimators, which are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. As 
results are similar, we summarize them jointly. Before CATS, betas tend to be lower than 
OLS estimators but there are no clear cut differences with them, but with two exceptions. 
The Banks sector estimators are much higher (Le. systematic risk could be greater than the 
OLS betas) and Communications sector betas are lower. After CATS, OLS, SW and 
CHMSW estimators are in close agreement, suggesting that price adjustments are faster than 
before. 
Residual autocorrelations are pretty similar as were with OLS estimators, a result not very 
surprising given the results in Brown and Warner (1985). Before CATS some sectors present 
significant first order autocorrelations, specially Banks and Communications. After CATS, 
4 Only results for sectors are presented, which are equally weighted portfolios of 
individual securities. We also performed the analysis with market value weighted portfolios 
and results were very similar. These results and the ones for individual stocks are available 
on request. 
S CHMSW estimators for values of n = 2, 3, 4, 5 were computed (available on 
request). Figures in Table 4 are for n = 5. The differences between them are small due to 
low autocorrelations in the index market returns. 
8 
only Banks remain with significant figures, which suggests less frictions in the price 
formation process. 
5.1 A COMMENT ON WHY BANKS ARE DIFFERENT 
It can be argued that before CATS, trading systems are one relevant factor for the peculiar 
Banks sector behavior. The usual trading system for all non-Banks stocks before CATS 
where a verbal call auction ("l la criee"). But Banks were traded on a written order entry 
system ("par cassiers"). The system was as follows: trading orders are accumulated in an 
order "book". If supply and demand do not exactly balance, one clearing price is set which 
maximizes trading volume. Therefore if one order is of high volume enough, it can influence 
the final "equilibrium" price. 
The work by Berges and Soria (1992) suggests that Banks used to "care" about the pricing 
of their own stock, directly or through participated firms, using tactics like using "stoppers" 
(Le. high volume orders) to keep prices around desired targets. These strategies, if 
permanently applied, could help to explain the two basic features that distinguish the Banks 
sector from others. First, repeated interventions of this kind could create dependence in price 
changes. Second, relationship with market evolution should be weaker. That is exactly the 
kind of features we find in the Banks sector. Strong first order autocorrelation, which 
suggests an almost daily interventions and then, low betas that when corrected for price 
delays increased significantly. After the reform, OLS betas and adjusted betas are similar, 
and autocorrelations decreased, suggesting that CATS prevents to some extent these 
intervention tactics. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Some microstructure consequences of the Spanish Stock Exchange Reform on measures of 
systematic risk and autocorrelations of daily asset returns are studied. Using a sample of 
selected stocks we find after the Reform significant decreases in autocorrelations. The Banks 
sector shows some special features, which are explained in terms of the trading mechanism. 
Results suggests that some kind of price intervention was not uncommon before CATS. After 
CATS the evidence is much weaker, suggesting that the Reform had increased market's 
operational efficiency. 
,-------r ---
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TABLE 1 
SECTOR FIRMS SECTOR M.V. IGBM WEIGHT 
Foodstuffs 3 44.1% 2.3% 
Banks 4 55.1 17.0 
Communication 2 90.1 7.7 
Construction 6 50.2 6.9 
Electric U. 6 88.7 13.1 
Investment 2 40.3 2.3 
Chemical 5 34.5 3.8 
Iron & Steel 8 40.5 2.4 
Various 1 45.2 1.7 
,---------------------------------,,.--
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TABLE 2 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOOD 1.31 1.48 0.92 0.03 0.18 0.08 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.24) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) 
BANK 0.78 0.64 1.27 0.34 0.37 0.25 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
COMM 1.08 1.24 0.57 -0.15 -0.18 0.11 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CONS 1.67 1.77 1.44 0.10 0.13 0.08 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
ELEC 1.16 1.28 0.96 0.05 0.12 0.09 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
INVS 0.84 1.03 0.50 0.04 0.11 0.03 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
CHEM 1.63 1.73 1.44 0.03 0.06 0.02 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
IRON 1.68 2.03 1.09 0.06 0.08 -0.02 
(0.11) (0.21) (0.15) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
OTHR 1.54 1.61 1.46 0.08 0.16 -0.03 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
ALL 1.34 1.48 1.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 
STOCKS (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
(7) 0.0165 0.0181 0.0158 0.0152 0.0168 0.0144 
(I) OLS Beta lOul! ..mple (2) OLS Beta before CATS (3) OLS Beta after CATS (4) First order residual autocorrelation total ..mple 
(5) First order residual autocorrelation before CATS (6) First order residual autocorrelation after CATS 
(7) Residual standard error (total portfolio) 
Numbers in brackets are heteroscedastic-consistent asymptotic standard errors (White's covariance matrix). 
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TABLE 3 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOOD 1.26 1.43 0.96 0.04 0.17 0.Q7 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.21) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
BANK 1.03 0.90 1.32 0.30 0.34 0.23 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
COMM 0.77 0.86 0.52 -0.13 -0.17 0.11 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CONS 1.65 1.73 1.40 0.10 0.13 0.08 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
ELEC 1.02 1.10 0.85 0.04 0.11 0.08 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
INVS 0.79 1.05 0.42 0.04 0.11 0.03 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
CHEM 1.46 1.54 1.33 0.03 0.06 0.02 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
IRON 1.66 1.96 1.14 0.06 0.08 -0.02 
(0.09) (0.18) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
OTHR 1.62 1.85 1.36 0.08 0.17 -0.03 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
ALL 1.25 1.38 1.03 0.Q7 0.09 0.05 
STOCKS (0.05) (0.10) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
(7) 0.0163 0.0196 0.0158 0.0152 0.0171 0.0146 
(I) SW Beta total aample (2) SW Beta before CATS (3) SW Beta after CATS (4) First order residualautocorrelation total aample 
(5) First order residual autocorrelation before CATS (6) First order residualautocorrelation after CATS 
(7) Residual standard error (total portfolio) 
Numbers in brsckets below Betas are asymptotic standard errors (Scholes and Williams (1977) equation (26» and below autocorrelation 
estimators are heteroscedastic-consistent asymptotic standard errors (White's covariance matrix). 
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TABLB4 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOOD 1.20 1.39 1.06 0.04 0.17 0.07 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
BANK 1.10 0.94 1.34 0.30 0.34 0.23 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
COMM 0.71 0.80 0.51 -0.13 -0.17 0.11 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CONS 1.64 1.71 1.38 0.10 0.13 0.08 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) 
ELEC 0.97 1.02 0.81 0.04 0.11 0.08 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
INVS 0.72 1.04 0.51 0.04 0.11 O.oJ 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
CHEM 1.36 l.S2 1.23 0.03 0.06 0,02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
IRON l.S6 1.90 1.15 0.06 0.08 -0,02 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
OTHR 1.64 1.83 1.31 0.08 0.17 -0.03 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
ALL 1.21 1.18 .98 0.07 0.09 0.05 
STOCKS (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
(1) CHMSW Beta total sample (2) CHMSW Beta before CATS (3) CHMSW Beta Ifter CATS 
(4) First order residuII lutocorrelltion total sample (5) First order residuII lutocorrelltion before CATS 
(6) First order residual autocorrelation Ifter CATS 
Numbers below autocorrelation estimators are heterolcedastic-consistent lSymptotic standlrd elTOrs (White'l covarilnce matrix). 
